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VIII.—*Horace, Sermones*, I, I

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IN his introductory note to *Horace, Sermones*, I, I, Palmer (ed. 4, 1891, p. 113) wrote as follows:

There are in reality two subjects, discontent and avarice, but Horace tries to treat them as one, and the suture is apparent. The different individuals, who, discontented with their lot, are struggling to attain a competence, are regarded as so many phases of the *avarus*, 28–40. Hence discontent ceases to be the salient feature of attack, and the grasping and meanness of the *avarus* are satirized on to 108, when Horace, feeling that he had strayed from his original theme, suddenly reverts to it, and cleverly interlaces his two subjects together.

These words are typical of a good deal of the criticism of this *sermo*. In his *Horace and the Elegiac Poets*, 62, Sellar, discussing this *sermo*, declares, among other things, that Horace “has no claim to be a systematic thinker.” Kiessling (ed. 4, by Heinze, 1910, p. 2) says:

Von hier (*i.e.* from verse 22) führt keine Brücke zu den folgenden Erörterungen, so sorgfältig auch Horaz den Bruch zu verdecken sucht, und so geschickt auch die Wiederholung der Eingangsworte im Schlussabschnitt den Schein der Einheitlichkeit des Ganzen zu erwecken weiss. Wir haben es also mit keiner in sich geschlossenen Konzeption des Dichters zu tun, bei der solche Inkonssequenzen unerklärlich wären.

He then suggests that Horace, bent primarily on “Reichtum der Motive und Lebhaftigkeit der Darstellung,” prefixed to his observations on *avaritia*, which he drew mostly from Greek writings Περὶ Φιλοπλούστιας, materials got from other sources, possibly also Greek, *i.e.* “die dramatisch-lebendige Schilderung der μεμψιμοιρία . . . ohne dass es ihm gelungen wäre, die Spuren dieses Verfahrens völlig zu verwischen.” See also Kiessling-Heinze on *Horace, Serm.* I, I, 108.

To test these and similar dicta, I aim to present a careful analysis and criticism of the *sermo*. Old points will, I hope, be set in new light or will be fitted together better in a well-rounded whole; new points will be made. Further, particular parts of the *sermo* will be discussed exhaustively.

Horace begins by appealing to Maecenas for an explanation of the phenomenon that every man is discontented (1-3). With Kiessling we may note the stylistic value of the question form in these verses. In asking at once for an explanation of the phenomenon named, Horace takes for granted that Maecenas (*i.e.* every reader, every other person) is as thoroughly convinced as he is himself of the existence of the phenomenon; thus the assertion that men are discontented has behind it the weight of the personalities of all mankind.

Accordingly, we must admit that the passage *O fortunati mercatores . . . Fabium* (4-14) is not necessary,<sup>1</sup> either as justification of the assumption which underlies 1-3, or as illustration of that assumption.<sup>2</sup> Horace seems to suffer here from the cause which has so largely disturbed the orderly flow of Juvenal's writing, the ability to paint fine word-pictures, such as Friedländer calls "Cabinetstücke oder . . . kleine Scenen voll dramatischen Lebens."<sup>3</sup> Horace realizes

<sup>1</sup> In *Revue de Philologie*, xxvii (1903), 233-235 (= *The Classical Papers of Mortimer Lamson Earle*, 193), Professor Earle suggested that in 4 *O fortunatos mercatores* should be read. But the accusative, though possible enough, is not necessary; if proof is needed, witness *e.g.* Seneca, *Troades*, 144-145, *felix Priamus dicite cunctae*; 157, *Felix Priamus dicimus omnes*. In 4, again, Professor Earle (*ib.*) read *armis*, following Bouhier, because "grandem natu fictum illum ab Horatio militem non esse, id a *iam* particula quae in inequenti versu est elucet; ea enim vocula significat eum mature labore confectum esse." But quite apart from MSS. evidence, *annis* is far preferable. By itself *iam* merely denotes that some time has passed; but the context demands that we think of the soldier as both old and poor. He thinks that, had he been a *mercator*, he would speedily, long ago, have won riches.

<sup>2</sup> Professor Postgate's discussion of this *sermo*, in *Class. Rev.* xv (1901), 302-303, leaves these points untouched.

<sup>3</sup> See Friedländer's *Juvenal*, p. 48; compare also Sellar, *Horace and the Elegiac Poets*, 10-11. The stress laid by Juvenal in his first Satire (which recalls to all readers our *sermo*) on the *sportula*—stress that to various editors has seemed excessive—and the disturbance by that stress of the flow of thought in that Satire, especially in 127 ff., are phenomena more or less parallel to those in our

himself, perhaps, that 4–14 (to *Fabium*) are not altogether in point, logically, for he catches himself up in *ne te morer* (14), which equals *hactenus haec*, and recalls himself to his main theme, the answer to 1–3. Yet even now he seems not to pursue a straight path to his goal.<sup>4</sup> In *ne te morer*, etc. (14), he promises an answer; yet, on the surface, 15–22 form no part of such an answer.<sup>5</sup> They seem rather to emphasize the thought that the discontent assumed in 1–3 and illustrated in 4–12 is not genuine, since men will not exchange lots even at the bidding of omnipotence. 23–32 (to *cibaria*), akin in thought to 15–22, emphasize anew the lack of honesty which characterizes men's discussions of their discontent. Men say that they labor with a certain end — a very modest end — in view; and yet, even when that end has been attained, they labor on as energetically as before. Thus, *hac mente . . . cibaria* = *hac mente laborem sese ferre, senes ut in otia tuta recedant, aiunt, cum sibi sint congesta cibaria, sed numquam sibi cibaria congerere se posse ideoque se non probare, laudare diversa sequentis.*<sup>6</sup> Verses 14–35 thus mean, when finally interpreted: 'But enough of this: let me come to my point. This discontent does not, in fact, spring from

Horatian passage. We may well rejoice, however, that Horace inserted his demonstration or illustration in 4–12. Who would, for the sake of logic, surrender the masterly variety of forms employed in 4–12 to present that moment in the lives of the four typical persons selected at which the difficulties of his lot press most heavily on the speaker? See Kiessling-Heinze on 3.

<sup>4</sup> In 12 one difference between Latin and Greek is well illustrated: *viventis in urbe* is less exact than *τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει οἰκοῦντας* would be. The whole verse may be readily rendered in Greek by *τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει οἰκοῦντας μόνος εὐδαιμονίῃ*, a circumstance which may or may not have bearing on the suggestion, made e.g. by Kiessling and Morris, that Horace had before him a burlesque Greek drama.

<sup>5</sup> Professor Earle's suggestion (*Mnemosyne*, XXX [1902], 347 = *Classical Papers*, 347) that in 19 we should read *nolint*. *At quis licet esse beatis, quid cause*, etc., I rejected in *A.J.P.* XXXIV (1913), 330–331. To the points there made I may add that *Atqui licet esse beatis!* (so I would punctuate) might be replaced by a prosaic *quamquam eis licet esse beatis*.

<sup>6</sup> It seems unsound to mark a new paragraph at 23, as some editors do. 1–40 make one paragraph. Mr. Gow goes to the other extreme; he never paragraphs in any *sermo*. For the need of independent paragraphing, as of independent punctuation in our texts, and the important results that may come from such independent paragraphing, see *A.J.P.* XXVIII (1907), 57–59. See also p. 108.

the causes to which men attribute it; it does not come from genuine dissatisfaction of men with their lots as such or from real preference for the lot of another. Men are discontented not (*a*) because they prefer the lot of another, nor (*b*) because they have some objective point, some conception of a fair return for their labor which they cannot realize in their present occupation,<sup>7</sup> but rather because of a perverted attitude with respect to the measure of financial returns to be demanded of their lot, coupled with a certain disingenuousness which leads them to disguise this attitude under specious terms.' Horace is thus beginning to answer his opening question. At 36, however, he could not resist the temptation to make a telling rejoinder; this involves a picture of an *avarus*, a picture for which there is no justification in anything thus far said, but which is born of the tendency to hyperbole so naturally characteristic of satire.<sup>8</sup> Having introduced the *avarus*, Horace makes most effective use of him, in the dialogue and quasi-dialogue of 41-91. The course of those verses is as follows:

Question 1: 'What satisfaction does it give you to bury your hoard? Why don't you use?' So verses 41-42.<sup>9</sup>

Answer 1: 'To use what one has is to begin a process which will end only with the dissipation of all that one has' (43).<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> This may be put more briefly: 'nor because they fail to make some money.'

<sup>8</sup> In *Revue de Philologie*, XXIX (1905), 35-36. (= *Classical Papers*, 194) Professor Earle proposed to insert *ut* after *amoto*, 27: *sed tamen amoto ut quaeramus seria ludo* would pick up perfectly *ne sic ut qui iocularia ridens percurram*, 23-24; indeed, the emendation is too good, giving too perfect libration, for Horace's *Sermones*. It is worth while to note that the quotation of one plea men make in justification of their discontent runs, really, through 28-35. At *sicut parvola*, etc., 32-33, Horace drops the *oratio obliqua*, but by the parenthetical *nam exemplo est*, 33, he warns us that he is in reality still quoting. Neither Kiessling-Heinze nor Lejay (1911) makes this point. Professor Morris (on 40) saw part of the truth.

<sup>9</sup> With the picture in 42 compare, with the editors, Plaut. *Aul. passim*. See also *Trin.* 349, etc., and the prologue to the *Eunuchus*, 9-13, with Fabia's notes; and, finally, D. P. Lockwood, "The Plot of the Querulus and the Folk-tales of Disguised Treasure," *T.A.P.A.* XLIV (1913), 215-232.

<sup>10</sup> The *avarus* should logically have said *utaris*, not *commiuas*. But Horace well pictures the miser's dread of spending by making him substitute for *utaris*.

Question 2: 'Yet what beauty has money apart from use? Wherein does it profit a man to keep his money? What avails it merely to have money?' Verse 44, in which this question is asked, is much condensed: it = 'But, unless you do just that, your money is not money at all; it is a mere *constructus acervus nummorum*.' Horace might have written: at ni id fit, quid valet pecunia?<sup>11</sup> Quid habet pulchri constructus acervus? 45–49 (to *portarit*) are an explanation of the second question, in 44, and an elaboration of the point of view there; the mere having in one's possession of a large supply means nothing to one. Then, in *Vel dic . . . aret* (49–51), Horace restates, in slightly altered form, his question of 44: 'of what value is mere having?' Logically, the question *vel . . . aret* is unnecessary after the categorical declaration in 44–49, which really forms an answer, by Horace, who has taken the discussion entirely to himself, to Question 2. But the question *vel . . . aret* has stylistic value in that it enables Horace to take up the dialogue form again.<sup>12</sup>

Answer 2: At suave est ex magno tollere acervo (51). The *avarus* has shifted his ground. In his first answer (43) he objected to any use of money. Dislodged from that position, he now replies that, if one must use, it is pleasanter to use from a large pile than from a small store.

Question 3: 'So long as the amount used is the same (to wit, in each case, 'enough,' no more), what matters it whether the source of supply is unlimited or limited?' (52–53).

As in 45–49 Horace had elaborated his second question (44), so now in 54–56 he elaborates his third question;<sup>13</sup> he

the effect, from his point of view, of such using, as worked out, with logical appropriateness, in the apodosis of this sentence. The miser's emotion is far too strong for logic. Aside from such justification, the verse, as it stands, is a hopeless platitude.

<sup>11</sup> This thought, omitted here, finds full expression at last in 73.

<sup>12</sup> On *vel dic* see my note in *Class. Rev.* x (1896), 428.

<sup>13</sup> The awkwardness felt by many readers at *ut si*, 54, disappears when it is noted that 53 ff. = *absurdum est granaria te laudare, ut si*, etc. (= *ut absurdum sit si*, etc.).

concludes with a warning that a wrong attitude on this point is fatal to the moral life (56–60).<sup>14</sup>

It is worth while to review the *form* of 41 ff. Horace began with a point-blank question (41–42), to which the *avarus* made a terse rejoinder (43). Horace presses the attack with a second question (44), but he is no longer able to resist the temptation to preach and to elaborate his own point of view (45–49), and, lastly, to restate his second question in language conditioned by the turn this preaching has taken (49–51).<sup>15</sup> 49–51 = *cur tu mille potius quam centum ingera ares (arare malis)?* The *avarus* rejoins with a second terse remark (51); he is still completely on the defensive and utters no unnecessary word. Horace plies his adversary with a third question (52–53), but, without allowing opportunity for reply,<sup>16</sup> he gives point to his question by an illustration (54–56). 54–56 virtually = *cur malis haurire ex magno flumine quam ex hoc fonticulo?* Hence the method used in 53–60 is identical with that in 45–50; in each case the question is in reality stated twice. There is, however, no formal balance in either case. In 54 ff. Horace drops largely the rôle of interlocutor and assumes almost entirely that of preacher; witness the allegorical moralizing of 56–60.<sup>17</sup> Dialogue yields to monologue. Horace has more or less forgotten his definite *avarus* of 41–45, and so is able to write in 61 in *narrative* form instead of in the dialogue form of the preceding twenty verses, and to employ in 61 a virtual plural, in *bona pars hominum*. Had he been minded to keep the dialogue form in its entirety, he ought not to have written 61 at all, and he should have written in 62, *nil satis est umquam quia*

<sup>14</sup> See Porphyrius's excellent remarks on 56 and 59, overlooked, to the detriment of their commentaries, by many modern editors. For a similar allegory in Horace see *Epp.* I, 1, 70–75, with Greenough's note on 73. Compare, too, the use of *funera* in Juvenal, 8, 192; and, finally, compare the latter verse with Juvenal, 3, 85. For allegories in Horace in other fields see *Carm.* I, 14; *Epp.* I, 20.

<sup>15</sup> *vel dic . . . aret* springs out of 45.

<sup>16</sup> Apparently, no answer comes to the third question. But note what is said, in the text, just below, about verse 62.

<sup>17</sup> The *si*-clause in 57 is, logically, a needless repetition of verses 54–56, which are summed up sufficiently by *eo*, 56. Again, *plenior iusto* (57) sums up *magno de flumine* (55); *Aufidus acer* (58) again recalls *magno de flumine*.

*tanti quantum habeas sis*, or the like, as the direct reply of the *avarus* himself.

So far as the *thought* is concerned, 62 is the *avarus*'s reply to Question 3; it is Answer 3. The *avari* of 62 ff., with whom Horace is for the moment dealing collectively, dodge the point of his question, which has to do with using, as did its predecessors. In 63 ff. Horace reverts in part to the dialogue form; in *illi* he singles out once more a definite representative of the *avari*, and in hopelessness, real or pretended, turns from him to ask the world to notice that his case is hopeless (63-64). 63 ff. = *quid facias illi, quatenus libenter sua sponte miser est, ut ille miser qui memoratur Athenis*, etc.

In 64 ff., Horace, with the dialogue-monologue in full swing again, yields once more to his talent for drawing pictures;<sup>18</sup> he compares his imaginary interlocutor first with a notorious *avarus* at Athens, secondly with Tantalus (64-69).<sup>19</sup> At 69, *quid rides?* he addresses his single *avarus* once more, and from this point talks directly at him, but for the present gives him no opportunity to break in with answer or rejoinder.<sup>20</sup>

Question 4. In 73-79<sup>21</sup> Horace directs his fourth question at the *avarus*; even more clearly it sounds the depths of Horace's thought, for 73-79, rightly understood, mean, 'Why is it that you do not use? Is it because you do not know the

<sup>18</sup> See above, n. 3.

<sup>19</sup> On the point of the reference to Tantalus, still repeatedly misrepresented by editors, see my note in *Class. Rev.* x (1896), 429. This Tantalus passage of Horace was a favorite with Thackeray. An excellent paper might be written on Thackeray's use of Horace.

<sup>20</sup> In *Revue de Philologie*, XXX (1905), 35-36 (= *Classical Papers*, 194), Professor Earle, without argument, proposed *set* for *et* in 71. One might think of corruption here as due to haplography of *s* in *inhians set*; a suggestion which, by the way, accounts, within my observation, for a good many of the cases in the poets where our texts show *qui* for *quis* (the next word begins with *s*). But the change is needless. It is easy enough to say that *et* = *et tamen*; it is more scientific to say that here, as so often, the classical languages prefer unmodified co-ordination where English seeks to be more precise. Following Professor Earle's example one might, meter apart, easily—and needlessly—emend *et* in 37 to *set*.

<sup>21</sup> In 73 *ematur* is a volitive subjunctive (not a potential). Horace speaks in emotional, oracular vein: 'Take your money and buy bread with it,' etc. Similar is *Serm. I, 4, 71*, *nulla taberna meos habeat neque pila libellos*. On this latter passage see my note in *Class. Rev.* xi (1897), 359.

real value—the only value—of money (or, more briefly, because you do not know any better?), or is it because you really enjoy your lot as *avarus*?’ The second alternative is to Horace manifestly unthinkable: note his commentary on it in *horum . . . bonorum* (78–79).<sup>22</sup> 74–75 give Horace’s creed with regard to money: its one value lies in the power it gives to purchase the necessities of life. Here, be it noted, Horace is restating the creed which all men profess (28–32), but which they honor in the breach rather than in the observance (36–40). Horace now claims the floor entirely for himself, and becomes again the preacher (80–91). *At si* (80) is an example of the rhetorical device known as *occupatio*; its rhetorical and stylistic value lies in the fact that it drives the *avarus* into the background, and enables Horace to continue speaking himself. ‘You may tell me that money at least brings to one help in sickness; I reply that it does not. Your *avaritia* robs you of the affection of all alike, even of that of your kin, with which nature started you out in life’ (80–85).<sup>23</sup> Verses 86–91 belong closely with 84–85.<sup>24</sup> Verses 84–85, which state the facts as Horace sees them, correspond to 68–72, which give the truth at that point. 84–91, taken as a whole, correspond in function to 73–79; here, as there, Horace is asking, in the form of an alternative question, for an explanation of the facts; here, as there, he begins the alternative which is to him, in the last analysis, unthinkable with *an*,<sup>25</sup> which, speaking loosely, we may say is equivalent

<sup>22</sup> The wide separation of *horum* and *bonorum* is intentional; the sense is, ‘in such things I should prefer . . . if they are goods.’ Similar in position and effectiveness is *amico* in *Serm. I*, 4, 35, non cuiquam parcer amico, ‘he will spare no one, friend though he is.’ Elementary as these points are, they have been often overlooked.

<sup>23</sup> The thought of this concluding relative clause in my paraphrase is left by Horace to inference in 80–85; to make misunderstanding impossible it is stated in terms in *nullo natura labore quos tibi dat* (88–89).

<sup>24</sup> 86–87, if taken by themselves, make a very effective *neque iniuria*. But they belong intimately at once with 84–85 and 88–91.

<sup>25</sup> From my analysis we draw a sure solution of a notorious crux in this *sermo*. *An si, ac si, at si* have all been read in 88; see, e.g., Palmer’s note. My analysis makes overwhelmingly for *an si*. Professor Morris (1909), following Palmer in reading *at si*, says: “The decisive reason, in my judgment, for rejecting *an* is

to *num*. In detail, 86–87 correspond to 73–75, 88–91 to 76–79. If put more exactly into the form of 73–79, verses 86–91 would run, meter apart, thus: *Tu re vera argento omnia postponis, ideoque cognatorum non mereris amorem?* (or, more briefly and effectively, *Nescis quomodo cognatorum amorem mereri [retinere] possis?* see 73), *an si cognatorum*, etc. In both passages Horace clearly indicates which alternative is, in his judgment, to be rejected.<sup>26</sup> To get the true sense of 88 ff. we must render thus: ‘Or can it be that you believe that, if you should will to retain and conserve that friendship of your kinsmen which nature gives you without any toil on your part, you would unhappily be wasting your time . . .?’ All this Porphyrius saw clearly; he read *an si*, and interpreted by *an te putas ita operam perdere*, etc. But the modern critics here, as elsewhere, disregarded the ancient, to their sorrow (see, e.g., my note on Catullus, 62, 39–58, in *Class. Rev.* x [1896], 365–368).<sup>27</sup> In 86–91 Horace has said,

that it is incompatible with the emphasis laid upon *perdas* by the comparison which follows.” But in fact the weight of *operam perdas*, coupled with the correspondence of 84–91 to 73–79, is an unanswerable argument for *an si*. The weightier part of 73–79 is 76–79: it is introduced by *an*. A powerful objection to *at* in 88 is the fact that by this reading Horace is made to justify the *avarus*’s conduct! Lejay (1911) reads *an si*, and, following Porphyrius, interprets rightly, though he misses entirely the considerations advanced by me above in support of *an*.—Incidentally, we may note here, as above, n. 14, that the modern editors of Horace have suffered because they failed to learn from Porphyrius.

In *Revue de Philologie*, xxix (1905), 35–36 (= *Classical Papers*, 194), Professor Earle proposed to eject 87, to get a smoother passage. The verse is, to be sure, not necessary, either logically or syntactically. Still, to eject the verse — *ista quidem vis est!* Earle’s further suggestion, also unsupported by argument, that 80–83 should be set after 91, analysis of the *sermo* renders wholly untenable.

<sup>26</sup> Here, by *nullo natura labore quos tibi dat* (88–89); above, by *horum . . . bonorum* (78–79). Horace leaves nothing to chance in this discussion.

<sup>27</sup> In *nullo natura labore quos tibi dat* (88–89) we must supply *tuo*. The editors have not, I think, pointed out that *tu* in 86 makes the ellipsis less harsh. To the other example of such ellipsis cited by editors from Horace, *Serm.* I, 9, 59–60, add Terence, *Ad.* 490, *quod vos ius cogit, id voluntate (vostra) impetrat*. See also my note on Ter. *Ad.* 20–21 in *Class. Rev.* xxi (1907), 45. There *sine superbia (eorum)* = *nulla superbia (eorum)*, so that the passage is entirely parallel to our Horatian examples. Hence, Kauer’s criticism of my explanation of the Terentian passage in Bursian’s *Jahresbericht*, CXLIII, 258 f., falls to the ground.

in effect, 'It would be so very easy to *keep* friends if you would only try.' In 92 ff. he explains *how* friends are to be kept. These verses mean: 'Try it and you will see: the way to do it is to use<sup>28</sup> what you already have' (92-94). This is the point of the Ummidius story: 'he never used; witness his fate, unloved, slain by—a *liberta*!' The *avarus* sees plainly Horace's meaning; note his excited query in 101-102, *Quid mi igitur suades? ut vivam Naevius aut sic ut Nomentanus?*<sup>29</sup> In this furious question the *avarus*, forgetting his change of ground in 51, 55-56, returns to his original attitude (43); he has learned nothing. Even now he can

<sup>28</sup> Mr. Wickham's caption for this *sermo*, "The Folly of Wishing instead of Enjoying," gives part of Horace's meaning. To make it completely right we must add Horace's definition of enjoying—using to get the necessities of life, or using to get 'enough' (see the analysis of 45-49). For a fine commentary on our *sermo* compare Johnson, *Rasselas*, chap. xxv: "Wealth is nothing but as it is bestowed, and knowledge but as it is communicated." *Rasselas* is, in general, a good illustration of the universality of human discontent. So is the following clipping from the Boston *Post* of many years ago (I cannot give the exact date): "A rich man of Boston . . . told his son he must not stand idle, yet left to him the choice of business or profession. At the same time he wrote privately to twenty-four friends and acquaintances asking their advice in the matter. The twenty-four were prominent each in his own calling. And each replied in turn complaining of his own business, and advising the father to seek elsewhere for the future prosperity of the young man. The law was crowded, journalism brought but little money, banking was an uncertain prop, and so on throughout the catalogue. The father is still undecided; the boy is idle. And all because no one of the twenty-four is contented with his lot, while he admires the fortunes of other men."

<sup>29</sup> Professor Palmer commented on the omission of *ut* before *Maenius* (so he read); so Wickham, and so, as a possibility, Kiessling-Heinze. A strange note, surely! We have rather a combination of metaphor in *ut vivam Naevius* with simile in *sic ut Nomentanus* (*vivam*). We may note, in passing, that *ut vivam ut Naevius* would have been cacophonous. Palmer compares *Epod.* I, 32-34, *avarus ut Chremes . . . aut perdam nepos*; and *Epp.* I, 2, 42, *rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis*. In the latter passage, however, we have a metaphor; here, as so often, metaphor is far more effective than simile would be. *Epod.* I, 32-34, is not parallel, for there *ut* is expressed with the first alternative, and so could readily be supplied with the second, whereas in our passage *ut* is found only with the second alternative; it is difficult to supply from expression (b) something for expression (a). In *Epod.* I, 34, it may be noted with Smith, many MSS. give *ut* before *nepos*. For metaphor in Horace in place of simile compare a striking instance in *Serm.* I, 1, 99, *fortissima Tyndaridarum*; for metaphor and simile combined see *Epod.* 2, 1-5 (in many MSS. *ut* is given in 5 before *miles*).

find no middle ground between the use and the dissipation of money. In 101–107 Horace insists further that there is in fact such middle ground.<sup>30</sup>

I cannot help feeling that it is a pity that the *sermo* does not end here, since Horace has answered in full the question with which he began. He has, to be sure, not done this in terms, but he has done it none the less dramatically and forcefully. Discontent is due to a wrong attitude of all classes towards the returns they derive from their several occupations. All *do* receive returns — in fact, adequate returns, ‘enough’; yet, instead of contentedly using what they have, remembering that the only function of money is to supply man with what he absolutely needs (he can *use* only what he needs), men are ever pining for more money, and because a larger measure of wealth is not forthcoming they are discontented. In this perverted attitude toward their respective lots men are like the *avarus*; he is merely the extreme example of those who will not use what they have, but ever press on to acquire more. The large use made of the *avarus* in 36–107 is therefore justified.

If Horace has really answered his opening question, why does he ask his question afresh in 108?<sup>31</sup> Why has he added more (108 ff.)? Because he is not sure that his readers will

<sup>30</sup> I am not satisfied with editorial comments on *pergis . . . componere* (102–103). In opposition to Palmer, Kiessling-Heinze, Morris, Lejay, etc., I take *componere* not as ‘match together,’ but as ‘reconcile,’ as in *Serm. I*, 5, 29, *legati aversos soliti componere amicos*. What need is there to ‘match’ things that fight *frontibus adversis*? On the other hand, talk of ‘reconciling irreconcilables’ is wholly pertinent, in this context. Again, we may note, as the editors do not, that the things *pugnantia frontibus adversis* are Horace’s advice and the *avarus*’s (mis)interpretation of that advice; for a clear commentary see 103–104. Horace had said: ‘Don’t hoard: use.’ The miser, interpreting in terms of his first cry, at 43, takes this to mean, ‘Dissipate: squander.’

<sup>31</sup> I accept the reading *qui nemo ut avarus* in 108; see *A.J.P.* xviii (1897), 332–334. In his note on 108, Professor Morris refuses to admit that Horace returns “precisely to the opening question . . . the repetition of the text is a very suitable way of bringing the sermon to its conclusion.” But the text in this case was itself a question. In his introductory analysis of this *sermo*, Professor Morris says (p. 23): “The source of our unhappiness, to answer the question with which I began,” etc. Again, on 108 he makes *ut avarus* the substance of the answer.

see that the question has been answered.<sup>32</sup> The discussion, through 107, has been intricate; further, the free and easy way in which Horace has developed his argument has rendered him afraid that his readers will not catch the full significance of what he has said. We have seen the pains Horace took to guard against misapprehension; note the comments above on such guiding hints as *horum . . . bonorum*, 78–79, and *quos . . . dat*, 88–89. He might well fear, however, that after all he has not been clear. Again, it is not inconceivable that he was himself confused. At any rate, the question has had its full answer, and no further discussion is needed.

Where is the answer given to the question as asked again in 108? To this point the editors have given far less attention than it deserves. Those who interpret *ut avarus* in 108 as = *utpote avarus* (i.e. *avarus cum sit*), mean, though they do not state it in terms, that the answer comes at once here. In that case, the restated question is answered by Horace in *ut avarus* even before he completes, in *se probet ac potius laudet diversa sequentis*, the restatement of his question. On this I said something in *A.J.P.* xviii (1897), 332.<sup>33</sup> That this would be inartistic, no one will deny.<sup>34</sup> I believe that the

<sup>32</sup> This assertion will lose all appearance of extravagance after one has read through, e.g., the comment in Kiessling-Heinze<sup>4</sup> on 108. If astute modern editors have not seen the whole truth, even after Horace recurred to his question and restated his answer, we need not wonder that Horace felt restatement to be necessary at 108.

<sup>33</sup> In 1901, Professor Postgate, apparently without knowledge of my article, employed much the same arguments, in *Class. Rev.* xv, 302.

<sup>34</sup> It may be urged that my own explanation of *ut avarus*, as given in *A.J.P.* xviii, 333–334, is open to the same objection. I took *ut* in the sense of ‘as,’ and explained *qui nemo, ut avarus, se probet*, as = *qui nemo se probet, ut avarus se non probat*, or as = *qui omnes se improbat, ut avarus se improbat* (see below, pp. 108–109). The objection does lie, far more than I relish, against my view: verse 108 is, on any view of it thus far advanced, confused. It had been better if *ut avarus* had not been written at all in 108, and if the idea expressed by these words had come in first at *quodque aliena*, etc. (110–112). Nevertheless, the intrusion into the question of an illustrative phrase, *ut avarus (se non probat)*, is far less distressing than the injection of a causal, a question-answering phrase, *ut (= utpote) avarus*. The reader will do well to keep this note in mind below in subsequent discussions of other views of this troublesome passage.

Another difficulty in this passage, which cannot be set aside, is that in 108 ff.

real, logical answer begins rather in *neque se maiori . . . laboret*, etc., 111–112; *quodque aliena capella gerat distentius uber tabescat*, 110–111, is an elaboration of *se probet ac potius laudet diversa sequentis* (109), and so is part of the question itself. Note that the conjunction used in 110 is *-que*.

Granting that the answer to the restated question begins, at least formally and logically, at *neque se maiori*, we must still admit that artistically 108–112 are far from perfect, in that question and answer are not separated sufficiently. It had been better, logically, if Horace had said, in 111–112, *tabescat? Nemo se magnae pauperiorum turbae comparat*,<sup>35</sup> *hunc atque hunc superare laborat*. That Horace was conscious that his answer lay in *neque se . . . laboret* is clear from 113, especially from *sic festinanti*, which so well sums up the main part of 108–112. In 117–119 he tells us even more clearly that he has made his answer.

On the concluding verses, 120–121, we have a fine commentary in what Wickham says, in his edition of the *Satires* and *Epistles* (p. 7, n. 3), about the way in which Horace closes some of his *Sermones* (see also Morris on 121). See Wickham's like comment on certain of the Odes, in his Introduction to the Odes of Books I–III, paragraph 11, 3.

It remains to consider attempts to explain 108 ff. made since the publication of my paper in *A.J.P.* xviii (1897), 332–334. In *Class. Rev.* xv (1901), 302–303, Professor Postgate rejected *qui nemo ut avarus, nemon ut avarus*, and *nemo ut avarus*, in 108. He held that to Horace “avarice is the cause of the universal discontent. This . . . conclusion . . . must be put in clear and emphatic terms.” Therefore, “we want a particle which definitely means *because*.” *Ut*, he

Horace admits no exceptions to the statement that men are discontented; in 117 he does admit exceptions (note *raro*, and see Morris on 117–119).

<sup>35</sup> Once again Horace has let his descriptive powers run away with him; see above, p. 92, with n. 3. Thus, in 108–112, much as in 23–40, he has drifted rather than sailed onward in his discussion. But the artistic dislocation is more severe here, in view of the brevity of the passage, than in 23–40. Logically, Horace could have stopped at 112 (had he not already stopped at 107). Verses 113–116 restate 110–112; they cannot stand by themselves, at least if *sic* be kept in 113, with the manuscripts. On the other hand they are logically needless.

thought, is not strong enough to give this sense. Hence, rejecting *quod nemo, ut avarus*, which, he says, "some one" had suggested, he proposes, what Nipperdey had conjectured :

Illuc unde abii redeo, nemo ut, *quia avarus,*  
se probet

"The *a* of *quia* was lost because of '*avarus*', and *qui* was displaced; hence it appears before *nemo* in the Blandinian."

Quite apart from its audacity, Professor Postgate's reading has weaknesses. Supposing an ellipsis of *sit* with *quia avarus*, he renders by "I return to my point, how that no one is contented *because* he is avaricious." This is certainly harsh. Nor is Horace given to using *ut* in interrogative clauses. Further, the imagined ellipsis of *sit* is, to say the least, difficult. Professor Postgate seeks to support it by *Serm.* 1, 6, 8 and 1, 6, 53. But 1, 6, 8, *cum referre negas quali sit quisque parente natus, dum ingenuus*, is not parallel. *Dum ingenuus*, it might be said, more naturally suggests a subjunctive than does *ut avarus*. But, leaving the subjective, we have the weighty fact that *dum ingenuus* follows, in place and logic both, the subjunctive clause *quali sit natus*, of which it is an integral part. The ellipsis of the subjunctive is least uncommon under such circumstances, or when another subjunctive (usually in the same construction) precedes or follows in the same sentence. See e.g. *Aeneid*, I, 517-518, *speculantur . . . quae fortuna viris (sit), classem quo litore linquant, quid veniant*; and *Livy* I, 18, 3, *quae fama in Sabinos (adlata esset)*, etc. Consult Schmalz, *Lateinische Grammatik*<sup>4</sup>, § 21, b (p. 335), a passage none too clear, and the clearer statement in Kühner<sup>2</sup>, II, 2, p. 554 (= § 240, 7, Anm. 1), that this ellipsis "findet sich, wenn auch selten. So besonders in Finalsätzen und indirekten Fragen." Finally, the ellipsis proposed by Professor Postgate is harsher than that suggested by Professor Palmer (of *fiat*), which no one has accepted; weak though Palmer's argument was, that the ellipsis of *fiat* was possible because of the clear-cut reference back to *qui fit*, I, there is not even that much to be said for Professor Postgate's suggestion. It is odd, too, that Professor Postgate, after objecting

to the view that *ut avarus* = *ut pote avarus* because to answer a question “in the same clause in which he puts it . . . outrages . . . the laws of rational expression,” himself, by reading the strong *quia avarus*, makes Horace, even more completely than any one else had done, answer his restated question before he fully puts it again.

In his edition of Book I of the *Sermones* (1901) Mr. Gow prints 108 thus:

Illuc, unde abii, redeo, † nemo ut avarus

In his critical note (pages 5–6) he declares that this text gives the best sense, but that he does not believe it to be what Horace wrote. In his commentary, seeking to interpret this text, whose validity he doubts, he explains *ut . . . probet* as a “substitute for accus. with infin. as in S. I. 3. 115–120, or Nepos Hann. 1 *si verum est—ut populus Romanus omnes gentes virtute superarit.*” But these passages are in no way parallel. In I, 3, 115 (nec vincet ratio hoc, tantundem ut peccet idemque) *vinco* with *ut* and the subjunctive is not a substitute for *vinco* plus the infinitive (used in *Serm. II*, 3, 225), any more than *persuadeo* with infinitive is anywhere a substitute for *persuadeo* with *ut* and the subjunctive. And, surely, to say that in *Serm. I*, 3, 120 (nam *ut ferula caedas meritum maiora subire verbera non vereor*) *ut* with the subjunctive is a substitute for the accusative and the infinitive is a somewhat airy way of disposing of syntactical difficulties. When Mr. Gow addressed himself seriously, in his note on I, 3, 120, to the discussion of that well-known crux, he said not a word about the substitution of *ut* with the subjunctive for the accusative with the infinitive. Nor is the passage cited from Nepos by Mr. Gow pertinent: there is a distinct difference, though grammarians and editors seldom take the pains to point it out, between *verum est eum haec facere* and *verum est ut haec faciat*, as there is between *mos est eum haec facere* and *mos est ut haec faciat*.

Not content with such rough handling of the syntax of our passage, Mr. Gow, in 113–114, does violence to the manuscripts, and again to syntax. Following Postgate (*Transac-*

tions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, 1890, p. 180), he transposes *sic* and *ut* in 113-114, and puts a comma after 112, and a period after 113. Thus 113-114, which are happily mated in the MSS., Mr. Gow rudely tears asunder. For this transposition he does not cite Postgate's reasons and he gives none of his own. He merely remarks, in his commentary, that "*obstat* is indic. because *ut obstat* would be ambiguous." To syntax, too, great violence is done in the shift of mood, from the six-fold subjunctive in 109-112 to the solitary indicative in 114, to avoid ambiguity! But, further, in this text *festinanti*, left naked, is vague and feeble. On the other hand, the manuscript text *Sic festinanti . . . ut*, etc., with the usual punctuation, is as clear as crystal, is full of force, and by it Horace gets, finally, that definite answer to his twice-asked question which common sense demands.

In 1903 Professor Earle proposed to read and point as follows:<sup>36</sup>

Illuc unde abii redeo. Quia nemo, ut avarus,  
se probat ac potius laudat diversa sequentis  
quodque aliena capella gerat distentius uber  
tabescit neque se maiori pauperiorum  
turbae comparat, hunc atque hunc superare laborat —  
sic festinanti semper locupletior obstat —  
ut, cum carceribus missos rapit ungula currus,  
instat equis auriga suos vincentibus, illum  
praeteritum temnens extremos inter euntem ;  
inde fit ut raro qui se vixisse beatum  
dicat et exacto contentus tempore vita  
cedat uti conviva satur reperiire queamus.

Before we consider Professor Earle's argument we may group together the changes his readings and his pointing involve: a period after *illuc unde abii redeo*; the replacing of *qui* of V by *quia*; *probat* for *probet*; *laudat* for *laudet*; *tabescit* for *tabescat*; *comparat* for *comparet*; *laborat* for *labo-*

<sup>36</sup> In *Revue de Philologie*, xxvii, 233-235 (= *Classical Papers*, 191-193). Nipperdey (*De locis quibusdam Horatii*, etc., Jena, 1858, p. 9) had anticipated Earle in reading *quia, probat, laudat, tabescit, comparat, laborat*. So Professor F. G. Moore tells me; he adds that in December, 1890, he heard Vahlen describe these changes as "nicht Methode, sondern Willkür."

*ret*; the making of 113 parenthetical, and the consequent divorce of *sic . . . ut*, 113–114; taking *ut*, etc., 114 ff., with *laborat* and the preceding verbs, 108–112, over the difficult hurdle of *sic* in 113, so hard to separate from a neighboring *ut*; a semicolon after 116, instead of the usual period;<sup>37</sup> and, finally, the taking of 108–119 as one giant sentence. Surely, only overwhelming difficulties with the MSS. text, surmountable in no other way, would justify such wholesale changes.<sup>38</sup> Professor Earle's statement of his reasons for feeling that emendation is necessary is of the briefest, and amounts to this: as the MSS. deliver the passage to us, we do not get the "*iustum responsum*" to Horace's initial question which we have a right to expect. Only emendation, he continues, can give us that answer. The rest of his remarks it will be best to cite in full:<sup>39</sup>

Sic constituto famoso hoc loco statim legenti appârebit *quia* et *inde* particulas inter sese respondere. Quod vero in versibus 109–111 qui fuerant indicativi in modum coniunctivum migrarunt, eius rei fons et origo fuit *Quia* particula in *qui* detorta, quae detorsio inde profluxit quod librarius aliquis initium carminis est alieno tempore recordatus. Ad versum autem 113<sup>m</sup> quod attinet, rectissime is se habet, modo tanquam, διὰ μέρον, ut aint Graeculi, eum interiectum accipiamus, quasi fuerit *sic* (= adeo) *semper obstat* ⟨*ei*⟩ *festinanti* (= dum festinat) *locupletior* ⟨*alter*⟩. Atque ne nunc quidem prorsus iustum ad interrogationem suam responsum reddit Horatius, qui sic respondeat quasi ab initio quaesierit, qui fiat ut vix quisquam sua ipsius sorte contentus neque alienam cupiens vita discedat. At hoc fortasse est cavillari.

At first blush Professor Earle's rewriting of this whole passage has charms. For one thing, it provides a categori-

<sup>37</sup> If I were to accept Professor Earle's text, I should put a comma after 116.

<sup>38</sup> Lejay, in his elaborate edition of the *Sermones* (Paris, 1911), says of Earle's text: "Le remaniement proposé par M. Earle . . . est ingénieux, mais n'a aucune vraisemblance." His own discussion of the passage is brief and unsatisfactory. He reads *redeo, qui nemo, ut avarus*. Of the hiatus he says nothing. He takes *ut* as causal, but in no way meets the difficulties that interpretation sets up.

<sup>39</sup> Later, in *Revue de Philologie*, xxix (1905) (= *Classical Papers*, 195), Professor Earle wrote: "addidero . . . versum 113 melius fortasse se habiturum fuisse, si non ubi nunc est sed post versum 116 collocatus esset."

cal, unmistakable answer to the question of 1-3. Palaeographically considered, the rewriting is not impossible: *quia* in 108 *might* have been corrupted into *qui* by some scribe who recalled *qui* of 1; such an alteration *might* have led in its turn to the changes from the indicative to subjunctive which Professor Earle supposes to have taken place in 108-112. But it must be noted that the scribe who could do all this would be monumentally careless or else would be composer rather than copyist. Linguistically considered, the rewriting has charm, in that it gives a fine balance in *quia . . . inde*, 108-117. From conversations with Professor Earle, as well as from his writings (see *Class. Rev.* XII [1898], 393-394, XVII [1903], 103-105), I know that he believed that the ancients habitually wrote in sentences far longer than our modern punctuation would lead us to believe. This view I had reached independently; it lies at the bottom of my explanations of *atque* in *Aeneid*, vi, 185 (see *A.J.P.* xxvii [1907], 82), of my note on *etenim*, Cicero, *Cat. Mai.* 15 (see *Class. Rev.* XVI [1900], 216), and of my note on Cicero, *Lael.* 18-20 (see *A.J.P.* xxxi [1910], 72, n. 1).

But there are overwhelming arguments against Professor Earle's proposals. His numerous changes in the text are without MSS. support. Besides, as will be shown below, these changes, violent though they are, do not meet the logical difficulties in 108. What is gained, then, by them? To make 108-119 one long sentence introduces fresh difficulties: the weakening of 113-114 by divorcing *sic* and *ut*; the harshness of 113 taken as parenthetical; the wrenching of *sic* out of the sense a neighboring *ut* inevitably suggests for it into that of *ad eo*; and the difficulty of carrying *ut* in 114 over *sic* in 113 to 108-112.

There is a still more serious objection. What, in Professor Earle's text, is the force of *ut avarus*? Of this he says nothing. *ut avarus* now can hardly = *ut pote avarus*, for a causal clause or phrase within a causal clause would be intolerable. We must supply, then, either *se probat* or *se non probat* with *ut avarus*. But the first of these would reduce the passage to nonsense, for it would then set up a sharp distinction be-

tween the contentment of the *avarus* and the discontent of the rest of the world. This would be to contradict the whole *sermo*. It would also make the long sentence 108–119 self-contradictory.

Shall we, then, with *ut avarus* supply *se non probat*? Scholars in general, in their discussions of this passage, are silent about the possibility of supplying a negative after *ut*, if *ut* is taken as = ‘as’; either this possibility has not occurred to them, or else, more probably, it has been silently rejected by them as unworthy of notice. Palmer mentioned it only to reject it absolutely. In *A.J.P.* xviii (1897), 333–334, I proved, I think, that the ellipsis of a negative in an *ut*-clause of comparison is not impossible. I admit that such an ellipsis is extremely rare. However, I can now add, perhaps, Cicero, *N.D.* III, 68, *Huic ut scelus, sic ne ratio quidem defuit*. On this passage J. B. Mayor cites *N.D.* I, 3, *sicut reliquae virtutes, item pietas inesse non potest*.<sup>40</sup> The linguistic difficulty, then, is not insuperable. But the resultant sentence is open to the objection stated above, n. 34.

<sup>40</sup> Euripides, *Medea*, 580 ff. is usually printed as follows:

ἔμοι γάρ θετις δίδικος ὁν σοφὸς λέγειν  
πέφυκεν, πλείστην ζημιαν φρλισκάνει·  
γλώσση γάρ αὐχῶν τάδικ' εὖ περιστελεῖν,  
τολμᾶ πανουργεῖν· ἔστι δὲ οὐκ ἄγαν σοφός.  
ὡς καὶ σὺ μὴ νῦν εἰς ἔμ' εὐσχήμων γένηγ  
λέγειν τε δεινός· ἐν γάρ ἐκτενεῖ σ' ἔπος.

So Earle and Nauck. But Professor Verrall gave (ed. min. 1888; the larger edition was published in 1881, so that the text here quoted represents Verrall's later views): *ἔστι δὲ οὐκ ἄγαν σοφός. ὡς καὶ σύ.* With this punctuation we are obliged to supply with *ὡς καὶ σύ* a negative expression, *οὐκ ἄγαν σοφός εἰ*, or, what amounts to the same thing, *ἄσοφος εἰ*. But of this ellipsis Verrall said not a word. His brief note on 584 deals only with the possibility of pointing as Earle and Nauck do, and with the interpretation of that reading. Assuming the possibility of Verrall's pointing, we get a Greek example parallel to the ellipsis I find in our Horatian passage, but as the result of emendation.

Professor Earle's comment on 584–585 I find very interesting: “Logical would be: *ὡς καὶ σὺ νῦν εἰς ἔμ' εὐσχήμων γενόμενος λέγειν τε δεινός οὐκ ἄγαν σοφός εἰ· ἐν γάρ κτέ.*, but the words that Euripides has put in Medea's mouth are the more vigorous and natural for their lack of strict logicalness.”

May one say that Euripides was led, in part at least, to adopt the vigorous prohibition because by so doing he avoided the ellipsis of a negative within a clause of comparison?